Governance of the Management of Public Debt in Japan by Yasuo Goto
  Policy Research Institute, Ministry of Finance, Japan, Public Policy Review, Vol.4, No.1, December 2008 1 
Governance of the Management of Public Debt in Japan 
 
   
Yasuo Goto 
Chief Economist, Research Center for Policy and Economy, Mitsubishi Research Institute 
 
   
Abstract 
   This paper deals with the issue of Japan’s public debt, particularly from a governance 
perspective. Japan’s public debt continues to follow a rising path mainly due to the fact that, in 
the harsh economic climate the country has experienced since the 1990s, the government has 
ended up increasing public sector spending in order to support the Japanese economy. Yet when 
we look back over these events, this is not the only problem; there are also concerns over 
whether the system has the rules and institutions necessary to deal with such a situation. Even 
if temporary measures are taken to alleviate a particular burden, there is no guarantee that 
financial discipline can be maintained in the long term if there are weaknesses in the system of 
governance. 
   There are problems first of all not only with public debt management, but also with the 
regulations which apply to government actions themselves. Since public debt obligation is one 
of the government’s concerns, the roots of any problems with governance are to be found within 
faults in regulations relating to the government itself. Recent New institutional economics has 
been fruitful in analyzing the government’s internal organizational structure and identifying its 
characteristic lack of commitment. 
   Using these concepts to look at Japan’s situation, we can see that it is characteristic that 
both the burden of debt is distributed among a variety of departments and that capital 
allocation and decision making are determined by mutual relations among those departments. If 
we were to trace the source of debt repayment capital, we would probably find that the burden 
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is borne in the last resort by general accounting. It cannot be denied that such a system could 
lead to a weakening of commitment to repayment on the part of the department using the funds. 
Furthermore, a system in which a number of different departments are involved in decision 
making would lead to characteristic problems with governance. 
      The basic policy for dealing with possible failure in governance with regard to public debt is 
to ensure there is a correspondence between authority and responsibility. Specifically, where 
you have the authority to incur debts, you have the responsibility to pay off those debts, and 
where repayment proves difficult, this also remains your responsibility. Where there is a 
possibility that full responsibility cannot be taken, then part of the authority should perhaps be 
returned to central government. This paper will consider corporate default legislation as a 
means of dealing with the former question, and the possibility of general debt management as a 
means of dealing with the latter. 
 
   
 
I.  Introduction 
 
      Japan’s public debt continues to increase. This is due not just to the issuing of government 
bonds, but to increases in municipal bonds and other kinds of public debt. The main reason for 
this is that the public sector has been supporting the Japanese economy throughout the harsh 
years following the collapse of the economic bubble. However, taking this into account, if we 
look back over the process which led to this swollen debt, we are left with the impression that 
there are no guarantees that the system regulating public debt has adequate support. 
      This paper argues that this is the current state of governance of public debt in Japan. When 
we talk of public debt, it is not only the management of debts accumulated in the past that is 
important, but also the management of the stock  o f  n a t i o n a l  a s s e t s .  H o w e v e r ,  i f  t h e r e  i s  a  
problem in governance of the flow of new debt burden, even if the debt can be controlled by 
temporary measures, there is the possibility that the debt will continue to increase unnoticed in 
the long term unless there is greater discipline. 
   In general, as far as Japan’s public sector is concerned, which organizations have authority 
over and responsibility for which parts of Japan’s public debt burden remains unclear. There are 
so many divisions and distinctions that there is always the possibility that governance will be 
ineffective. This tendency is not surprising when you consider the characteristic “vertical 
structure” of Japan’s political organization. There are concerns that the recent spate of 
decentralizations and privatizations, with reform of the Fiscal Investment and Loan program, 
local government fiscal reform, and privatization of the postal service, has served to further 
exacerbate this situation. 
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obligations should be met. In traditional economics, the government is generally assumed to play 
an overall, neutral role in rectifying market failures; the government is seldom seen itself as the 
subject of controls. However, a framework has been developed for considering questions of 
“government governance” in the light of public choice theory’s idea of the possibility of 
“government failure”, new institutional economics’ analysis of organizational behavior, and 
theories of corporate governance. 
      If there is a possibility that governance of Japan’s public debt is, or could become ineffective, 
the fundamental solution is to ensure correspondence between authority and responsibility with 
regard to public debt. Specifically, if one has the authority to accumulate debt, one should also 
have the responsibility to repay that debt, or for the fact that the debt cannot be repaid. On the 
other hand, if there is the possibility that the responsibility cannot be fulfilled, at least some of 
the authority should be returned to central government which has ultimate authority over the 
public sector. 
   The argument of this paper will proceed as follows. Firstly, we will provide a conceptual 
reassessment based on economic theories of not only the question of public debt, but of 
difficulties with control of government actions in general. The fruits of new institutional 
economics’ ‘Organizational Economics’ will be particularly important in this. We will then 
outline Japan’s public debt situation from a governance perspective. We will see the complexity 
of capital movement between government departments, and further, how a number of different 
departments are involved in decision-making and dealing with public debt. This situation can 
make governance of the public sector, which is from the start not easy, still more difficult. 
Finally, if there is a separation of authority and responsibility over public debt burden, we will 
consider what possible solutions there are to this problem. We will outline a means of 
identifying responsibility through ‘Public Body Default Legislation’, and ‘Centralized Debt 
Management’ as a means of returning some authority to central government. 
 
II.    Difficulties with Government Governance: Theoretical Background 
 
      The fundamental issue addressed by this paper is the regulation of public debt, but we must 
begin with the difficult question of the regulation of public bodies themselves. Fulfilling debt 
obligations is one of the activities of public bodies, and the difficulties with their regulation are 
rooted in the difficulties of regulating the government.
1 We will now survey the theoretical 
background to this issue of regulation of government, or as it has become known in recent 
parlance, government governance.   
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II.1.    The View of Traditional Economics   
 
II.1.1.  ‘Benevolent’  government  
 
   It is relatively new for economics to analyze thoroughly the activities of government. 
Although problems were evident, the analysis of public policy, including politics and 
bureaucracy, remained largely part of political science and public administration until the 1950s. 
Traditional economic analysis assumed government to be benevolent and supportive of overall 
economic advance as far as the market mechanism was concerned, and government action itself 
was rarely the core subject of analysis. Even Keynes’ theories were based on the premise of ‘wise’ 
government (the so-called Harvey Road presuppositions). Although it was commonly held that 
government existed to provide a social welfare function to compensate for market failures, the 
concept of government failure hardly featured.
2 In reality, government actions are not without 
effect upon economic mechanisms. There has been a gradual increase in studies which show that 
government does not necessarily act so as to maximize well-being of the economy in general. 
 
II.1.2.  Public  choice  theory 
 
   Since the 1960s, Public Choice Theory, as pioneered by Buchanan and Tullock, has rapidly 
developed in its analysis of public sector activity including that of government and political 
parties. According to Public Choice Theory, whose main interest was in public policy process, 
the groups at the center of policy decision making were, 1.the citizens, 2. parliament, 3. the 
administration, and 4. pressure groups. The basic position of Public Choice Theory is that 
parliament and the administration have their own agendas which might not necessarily be in the 
interest of society as a whole and which may cause them to act in a self-interested manner. 
Public Choice Theory has greatly advanced our understanding of the workings of the public 
sector. In particular there has been valuable research in such areas as public sector rent-seeking 
(Tullock, 1967); the political background to economic cycles (Nordhaus, 1975, etc.; Buchanan, 
1980; etc.); bureaucratic budget maximization theory (Niskanen 1971, 1975, etc.); policy making 
in a multi-party system; and government spending’s ‘fiscal illusion’.
3 
      The Public Choice Theory approach has provided many fruitful analyses and continues to be 
an important area of research. On the other hand, because it provides strong normative analyses 
of particular phenomena, it is now considered to be unable to provide an adequate framework 
for a unified analysis of changes in resource allocation. Many argue that it is essential for Public 
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Choice Theory to present a unified theoretical framework.
4 
 
II.2.    Recent Theoretical Developments – New Institutional Economics 
 
   New Institutional Economics attempts to provide a unified analysis of government action 
from the perspective of transaction cost, asymmetry of information, incentives, and so on.
5 New 
Institutional Economics begins by focusing on the behavior of organizations and the rationality 
of systems, and as such is ideal for studying the actions of government. 
 
II.2.1.  The  contract theory approach 
 
      Recent economic theory has moved its focus from an analysis of the market price mechanism 
to the study of contracts and organizations, since it is argued that, “the question of bureaucratic 
organization and the regulation of public corporations is one of the central topics of recent 
organization theory.” (Yanagawa, 2000). At the center of this movement is New Institutional 
Economics. 
      New Institutional Economics provides a number of approaches to the analysis of government, 
but a common thread is the presupposition of the individual rationality of bureaucrats and 
politicians. One approach uses a contract theory method assuming a principal-agent relation 
under asymmetry of information. In general, under circumstances of an asymmetry of 
information, there is the risk of moral hazard or adverse selection when the principal puts his 
trust in the agent, since he does not have adequate knowledge of the agent’s effort and ability. It 
is therefore necessary to draw up a contract under which the agent will act in the most 
appropriate way. But in reality, it is difficult to draw up a contract which takes into account all 
possible eventualities and ensures clarity of judgment. The study of such ‘imperfect’ contracts 
has recently been gaining ground.   
 
II.2.2.  Transaction  cost  economics 
 
      Within New Institutional Economics, it is Transaction Cost Economics which has particular 
interest in the “organizational form” of government activity. Oliver Williamson, who promoted 
the idea of Transaction Cost Economics, described the theory as an example of conflict within 
physical systems. There are a number of sources of transaction cost, including the members of 
the organization itself (bounded rationality, etc.), and the nature of the capital used in the 
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6 
      The fundamental idea of Transaction Cost Economics is that “when transaction costs can be 
cut, not through market pressure, but from within the organization itself, this becomes the very 
raison d’etre of the organization.” In contrast, neo-classical economics begins by assuming that, 
in the perfect market, transaction costs are zero, and so has little interest in the nature of 
institutions. Transaction Cost Economics analyzes the workings of organizations and 
institutions using the basic concept of transaction cost. From this position, provision by 
government is justified when the government can cut transaction costs internally rather than 
relying on external agents. 
 
II.3.  Government  Governance 
 
II.3.1.    Corporate governance and government governance 
 
      As we have seen above, “government failure”, where the government does not necessarily act 
so as to maximize profits across the whole economy, is becoming a widely accepted idea within 
economics.
7  It has been a great advance to be able to deal explicitly not only with government 
failure through lack of competence, but also with the question of incentives and problems with 
the system itself. It is only natural that questions of “governance” arise where there is the 
possibility of “government failure”.
8 However, governance of a public organization such as the 
government may be more difficult than that of a private enterprise. Meeting debt obligations is 
an important part of government activity, but the problem of governance with respect to public 
debt is rooted in the problem of regulating government itself. Let us now turn to the question of 
“government governance”.
9 
      It is not only government, but organizations in general which are difficult to regulate. This is 
clear from looking at the wide range of studies carried out under the heading of corporate 
governance. The field of corporate governance seeks to discover the appropriate means of 
regulation by dividing those involved into groups such as stockholders, creditors, managers, 
employees, etc. Theories of corporate governance can shed much light on the problem of 
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or “regulation”. See Miyakawa, Yamamoto (eds.) (2002, pp.10-16), and Kondo (2003, pp.1-7) for details 
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government governance. However, due to the factors given below, there are many more difficult 
areas when it comes to government governance than with corporate governance. 
 
II.3.2.    Reasons for difficulties with government governance 
 
 (1)  Lack  of  commitment 
 
      The government cannot keep its own promises: the deepest problem arising from the nature 
of government.
10 The issue of commitment has recently become an important concern not only 
in the government sector but also in Contract Theory, for example. The issue arises in situations 
where there is an incentive not to fulfill the original terms of a contract, and can arise in almost 
any field. However, if a private enterprise continues to break its promises, it will lose its own 
business opportunities and eventually face bankruptcy. In comparison, government, and 
especially central government, basically never believes it could face liquidation. From the very 
start, government has legislative power or the authority to impose taxes, so they themselves can 
move the goalposts. For a government with almost no possibility of bankruptcy, and in the final 
analysis, the power to renege on its own pledges, there are only limited penalties for breaking 
promises.
11 This question of a government’s lack, or possible lack, of commitment highlights a 
major difference with private enterprises.
12 
      The field of finance in particular carries the possibility of a typical lack of commitment. For 
example, even if the government promises to finance a temporary increase in debt by introducing 
a rationalization of their activities, they end up paying off the debt by raising taxes. In the 
language of economics, when there is a lack of commitment in the field of finance, there arises a 
dynamic or time inconsistency
13, leading to the possibility of a soft budget constraint problem
14. 
   A l t h o u g h  t h i s  p a p e r  d o e s  n o t  d e a l  d i r e c t l y  with the issue, there is also the important 
implication that the lack of commitment may rebound on the party breaking the promise. If the 
possible victim of any broken pledge is aware of this possibility they should either cover 
themselves in the contract against any such eventuality, or simply refuse to sign the contract in 
the first place. In so doing, the party breaking the pledge will also suffer a loss.   
                                                                            
10  See Ito, Osano (2003, p.386), etc. 
11  It is possible for individual legislators, the cabinet or the party in power to be called to account, but it is 
difficult to force the entire government to accept responsibility. 
12  For example, Laffont and Tirole (1988, 1993) show how a lack of commitment by a regulatory authority 
could have a ratchet effect on a regulated enterprise resulting in a softening of budget constraints. 
13  The concept of dynamic inconsistency was introduced by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and 
Gordon (1983), and is used in macro-economics to theorize inflation bias. The concept is used to 
describe, for example, the situation in which a central bank finds itself unable to follow through on its 
own policies, which is essentially a question of lack of commitment.   
14  The problem of soft budget constraints as elicited by Kornai (1979) is not necessarily based on the 
concept of a lack of commitment, or on the concept of dynamic inconsistency on which this was 
grounded (Akai (2000) (pp.332-334)). However, lack of commitment has come to be recognized as a 
source of soft budget constraints. 8  Y. Goto / Public Policy Review 
  (2)    The problem of internal organization 
 
      The second problem arising from the nature of government is the difficulties for governance 
arising from its particular organizational structure. Problems associated with “organization” 
have been the main interest of the organizational economics approach based on the concept of 
transaction cost.
15 However, recent analyses building on the fruits of game theory, such as 
Tirole (1994), and which aim to make explicit the incentives of organizations, have also gained 
ground. The factors identified by this research as being characteristic of government institutions 
are as follows. 
      A. The problem of the structure of governance 
      The organizational structure of the government sector is often more complicated than that of 
private enterprises. The structure of mutual association is arranged both laterally, (with 
particular agencies or departments having their own vertical structure), and vertically (with a 
ranking order within the public sector, including central government over local authorities, and 
government over government agencies). This internal structure could present problems for 
governance. In particular, where the structure includes a number of principals (a 
multi-principal structure). the possibility of conflict between principals or the opportunity to 
avoid monitoring, presents problems for governance.  A typical example is where several 
government agencies monitor a particular government organization. Furthermore, in the case of 
corporate governance, the ultimate monitoring function is in effect entrusted to major 
stockholders or the main bank. However, ultimate control of the government lies with the 
people (the citizens or taxpayers): a characteristically broad and shallow structure. In any case, 
the structure of governance creates problems for the monitoring of the government. 
      B. Problems of evaluation 
   Besides problems arising from the structure of governance, problems with government 
governance are also determined by difficulties with formulating a basis for evaluation. Is it is 
difficult to evaluate the public aspect which is an essential part of government activity using an 
objective standard such as cash figures. The typical example of justified government action is 
the correction of market failures, but most of the factors which bring about market failures are 
externalities which make market prices difficult to evaluate. Also, compared with private 
enterprise, there are many areas of government activity which cannot be disclosed. This 
asymmetry of information is one more obstacle to clear evaluation. Government departments 
also usually have a number of different tasks, and in extreme circumstances their objectives may 
even be opposed. Compared with the primary (though not sole) objective of private enterprises, 
to maximize profit, the multiplicity of tasks assigned to public sector activity makes evaluation 
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much more difficult.
16  Where it is difficult to make a precise numerical evaluation, the next best 
practical method is to compare performance with that of a competitor. However this method is 
limited by the fact that in many areas of government activity, there are no competitors. Hence, 
there are many factors which make it difficult to set standards for the evaluation of government 
activity. 
 
II.4.    Strategies for Improving Governance: General 
 
      In general, the fundamental means of ensuring appropriate governance is to match authority 
with responsibility. For example, the problem of agency can be alleviated by reducing the 
asymmetry of information (enhancement of monitoring), or adjusting the incentive structure, etc. 
We will now turn to some specific examples of this applied to government governance; though 
as we have already seen, the very nature of government itself means that none of these is perfect. 
 
II.4.1.  Enhanced  monitoring 
 
 (1)  Disclosure  of  information 
 
      Increasing transparency through disclosure of information is an effective means of enhancing 
governance. With regard to regulating government, this also provides valuable material for 
evaluating performance, so that what Hirshman (1970) calls “governance by voice” will be more 
effective. The Japanese government sector is also making progress in improving disclosure of 
information.
17 However, as we mentioned above, there are strong limitations on the disclosure 
of information regarding government activities, and the fundamental problem remains as to by 
what standard performance should be evaluated on the basis of this information.   
 
 (2)  Establishing  a  watchdog 
 
   Governance is often strengthened by establishing a watchdog to whom monitoring is 
e n t r u s t e d .  I n  r e s p e c t  o f  g o v e r n m e n t  g o v e r n a n c e  t o o ,  m a n y  a r e a s  o f  g o v e r n m e n t  h a v e  a l r e a d y  
adopted this system, with for example central government offices monitoring government 
agencies. However, there is no escaping the question of who will supervise the supervisors. 
                                                                            
16  The difficulty of assigning priority to many different policy objectives has been long discussed as the 
“voting paradox”, but there has been considerable research since the 1980s on the question of 
multi-tasking from an incentive perspective.    For the general theory, see Bernheim and Winston (1986), 
and for its application to issues of government, see Dixit (1996), Dixit, Grossman and Helpman (1997). In 
particular, Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) used their theory of multi-task agency to analyze the problem 
of introducing a system of incentives when a multi-task system makes it difficult to evaluate results. 
17  For example, the Freedom of Information Act (passed in 1999, implemented in 2001), the production of 
public sector financial statements, and the analysis of investment and loans policy costs following reform 
of the government Investment and Loan Program in 2001.   10  Y. Goto / Public Policy Review 
II.4.2.    The structure of incentives 
 
 (1)  Strengthening  responsibility 
 
      Designing a system of incentives which takes into account the asymmetry of information and 
other factors is an important research topic. However, we will consider here the slightly more 
general theme of creating appropriate incentives where there is an imbalance between authority 
and responsibility. Incentives based on achievement, with appropriate rewards and penalties 
depending on results, is an important strategy for enhancing governance.  However, where 
government is concerned, not only is it difficult to evaluate performance, it is also not easy to 
determine responsibility for undesirable occurrences. 
 
 (2)  Limiting  authority 
 
      On the other hand, there is also the possibility of limiting authority. For example, Schmidt 
(1996) raises the possibility, in the context of a discussion of privatization, that the problem of 
soft budget constraints could even be alleviated by limiting government access to information. 
Recognizing these issues, one possible course of action would be to identify and isolate tasks, 
but then we are still left with the next problem, namely that of regulating relations between 
organizations. 
 
III.    Characteristics of Japanese Public Debt 
 
II.1.  An Overview of Mutual Relations within the Public Sector 
 
   In the light of our conceptual discussion of government governance, let us now turn to the 
actual nature of public debt in Japan. To begin with, not only are there various types of debt, but 
there are also many different organizations carrying the burden of these debts. Figure 1 below, 
categorizes Japan’s public debt from this point of view. Central government (further divided 
into general and special accounting), regional government and government agencies owe debt in 
the form of bonds, loans, etc. 
   We will now look at the figures and structure of Japanese public debt concentrating on 1. 
capital flow, and 2. authority over the burden of debt. In respect of the former, even if an 
organization finds itself in debt, capital flow is difficult to regulate because the organization 
could receive repayment capital from a different government account or receive a further loan 
(roll-over, etc.). From an “authority and responsibility” perspective this is a question of 
responsibility for debt repayment, and in line with our theoretical discussion this is a question 
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the mechanism for regulating credit limits. The ability of any organization to increase by its own 
will the upper limit of its debt is equivalent to “authority”. This corresponds to the problem of 
organizational structure from the perspective of governance of public organizations. 
      If we look at the characteristic nature of Japanese public debt, we find the following:   
   (i)    The public sector is divided horizontally by special accounting, etc., and by the 
hierarchy that exists between central government, autonomous bodies and 
quasi-governmental corporations, and public debt capital is circulated across these 
various divisions. 
      (ii)  In this situation, the burden of debt, as far as the capital to repay the various public 
debts is concerned, could always fall ultimately upon general accounting.   
      (iii)  Since a number of departments are involved in decision-making whenever public debt 
arises, a complex round of discussions and negotiations becomes necessary. 
   Whether it be capital flow or authority over debt burden, the main issue is the relations 
between the various organizations within the pub l i c  s e c t o r .  I n  t h i s  p a p e r  w e  d i v i d e  t h e  
organizations within the public sector broadly into, 1. those concerned directly with finance 
itself, 2. the ministry of finance (the representative of general accounting), and 3. other areas of 
the public sector. Relations with the legislature (parliament) is an extremely important topic for 
research, though we will not discuss this issue in this paper, but we will focus on the 
administration as the public sector. 
 
III.2.    Cash Flow within the Government – The Burden on General Accounting 
 
      The topic of Japanese public debt financing covers a wide area including the various central 
government accounts, regional governments and governmental agencies. These can all pass 
capital back and forth between each other using various channels. For example, they can provide 
mutual funds for each others’ debts and provide subsidies as part of debt repayments. The 
capital used in this way finally comes back to general accounting, which is the core of public 
finance. Within the public sector, central government (particularly general accounting) has the 
strong power to provide repayment capital ultimately by raising taxes. From another point of 
view however, there is the potential for a lack of commitment regarding public debt. The 
structure of each public debt leads finally, either directly or indirectly, to central government, 
and in particular to general accounting. This structure potentially weakens commitment to 
reducing one’s own debts by oneself. 
 
III.2.1.  Mutual  relations  within the public sector 
 
   Let us begin by looking at the proportion of government to public capital underwriting of 
each public debt. Although levels vary, a significant amount of the capital is provided by the 12  Y. Goto / Public Policy Review 
government sector. In its basic form, this capital is provided by the public finance loan special 
account, public pensions special account, postal savings, and other sources such as surplus 
funds, which are then intermingled and circulated as a source of debt capital. 
   Although the 2001 reforms to the Fiscal Investment and Loan Program were intended to 
remove this capital flow which the original Program set up, elements of the basic framework 
still exist. For example, capital is provided for regional debt by fiscal loan capital, postal capital 
and public enterprise capital. Government bonds debt owed by government agencies is covered 
by fiscal loan capital and post office insurance. Even within central government, each special 
account borrows from the fiscal loan special account. Furthermore, government bonds 
(construction bonds, special bonds) which form the core of public debt, are partially financed by 
capital from pensions and postal savings. Together with the management of surplus funds, etc., 
this shows how public debts come to have a complex mutual influence within the government.
18 
Figure 1 and Chart 2 show how the various public debts are closely connected, with a general 
overview shown in Figure 1 provided separately. 
      It is important to note the nature of Bank of Japan funds. As a general rule, the Bank of Japan 
is prohibited from financing public debt. However, various systems exist by which funds can be 
raised, including the possibility of making exceptions under special laws, and acceptance as 
eligible collateral for credit by the Bank of Japan. If we include the Bank of Japan in our 
assessment, the tie-ups within the public sector in Japan with regard to public debt are even 
stronger. 
 
III.2.2.    Debt repayment capital and general accounting 
 
   We will now outline the repayment capital for public debt. Repayment capital differs 
depending on the nature of the public debt involved, but in general terms it can be divided into 1. 
tax revenue, 2. non-tax revenue, 3. subsidies from other government departments, and 4. new 
debts. Since the funds have no identifying characteristics, it is impossible to determine without 
any special steps which capital has been allocated. However, if you have incurred a debt, it is 
evident that repayment must be made using one of the sources 1-4. Hence, increasing public 
debt means an increased necessity to raise one or other of 1-4 in any combination.   
   In Japan’s case, as far as debt repayment capital is concerned, since subsidies and taxes 
allocated to local government are complicated within central government, it is difficult to 
understand at first glance. However, the fundamental fact is that, with its overriding authority, 
central government, particularly general accounting, is the main source of repayment capital. 
(Chart 3: details of the flow of repayment capital for the various debts are given in the attached 
Figure 2.) General accounting transfers the various funds to special accounts. Furthermore, 
                                                                            
18  For example, a finance bill issued by a special account provides surplus funds for fiscal loans special 
account which is used as surplus funds.   Policy Research Institute, Ministry of Finance, Japan, Public Policy Review, Vol.4, No.1, December 2008 13 
these special accounts provide tax revenues and subsidies to local governments, and capital and 
subsidies to government agencies. It can therefore be said that, by issuing more government 
bonds to provide repayment capital for other public debts, general accounting is itself increasing 
the overall public debt burden. 
   There is always the danger that a situation such as this, where public debts are ultimately 
returned to general accounting, could lead to a lack of commitment to repaying any debt directly 
and a softening of the budget. There are two ways in which there could be a lack of commitment 
to government debt. Firstly, there is the way in which debt is underwritten or repayment capital 
provided by the government. Secondly, when these debts are returned, general accounting can 
then procure funds by increasing taxes. The latter case is particularly an essential characteristic 
of government.
19 
      When public debts are underwritten by various departments within the government, it could 
be expected that when repayment becomes a problem, the conditions for repayment will be 
mitigated, since they are all part of “the family”. And, since the final credit source for public 
debts is the government, particularly general accounting, this expectation could result in a 
further burden for general accounting. This possibility cannot be dismissed as mere empty 
theorizing. For example, the debts of the national railways, which were part of the government 
sector, are still being borne by the state in the form of borrowing by general accounting. 
In fact, the financial markets have no concerns over the repayment of public debts. Although the 
debts of local governments and government agencies were originally separate from government 
credit, the financial markets have come to recognize the existence in fact of a “tacit government 
guarantee” covering those debts. For example, the spread between Financial Investment Agency 
Bonds, which are supposedly issued under the government agencies’ own credit, and government 
bonds, is generally small (Figure 2). 
 
III.3.    Debt Burden and Decision Making 
 
      One of the defining characteristics of Japan’s government sector is its vertical hierarchy, or 
what might be called its “divided pluralism”. This structure could be considered to have an 
influence on the governance of public debt. Let us now confirm the decision-making process 
regarding the debt burden in the light of the problem of internal structure as theorized in II. 
   The first characteristic we discover is that authority over debt burden has become 
complicated.  Many cases require approval (a vertical issue) and negotiation (a horizontal 
issue), or the involvement of a number of different regulatory authorities.  The Fiscal 
Investment Program Reform and the recent trend towards regional decentralization, mean that 
decentralization of authority can only get stronger. On the other hand, the structure of 
                                                                            
19  According to Kornai, there are five factors which contribute to budget softening: 1. price fixing, 2. the 
tax system, 3. subsidies, 4. national credit granting, and 5. external investment.   14  Y. Goto / Public Policy Review 
governance has not been fully decentralized. Central government continues to play a major role 
in local authority and government agency debt.
20 
   Following on from our argument about internal organization, this kind of complex 
governance structure often presents obstacles to establishing an incentive mechanism. 
Furthermore, the various departments involved in finance (general accounting, special 
accounting, local authorities, quasi-governmental organizations, etc.) have a number of different 
public duties, and so evaluation of performance is not easy. In these circumstances, the incentive 
for debtors to find capital to repay their debts by themselves, through for example improving 
efficiency, may be weakened. The regulatory authority applying governance may also become 
confused as to what level of inquiry the can impose. 
   A s  w e  h a v e  s e e n  a b o v e ,  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  J a p a n ’ s  p u b l i c  d e b t s ,  t h e  f l o w  o f  c a p i t a l  a n d  t h e  
decision-making power are very much determined by mutual relations between government 
departments. This kind of structure allows for power and responsibility over debt burden to 
become vague. 
 
IV.  Enhancing  Regulation 
 
   Where there is the possibility that governance of public debt may fail to be adequate, the 
fundamental steps to be taken to match power with responsibility and to create an appropriate 
incentive structure. To achieve this, there are two possible courses of action. Firstly, those 
departments that have the authority to put themselves in debt should be under a corresponding 
duty to repay those debts (strengthening responsibility). In conformity with recent moves 
towards decentralization, for example, where a public organization finds its debt repayments 
have become problematic, a system must be in place whereby the parties responsible can be 
clearly identified. Secondly, where there is a failure to accept appropriate responsibility, certain 
powers and monitoring functions must be given over to another party (limitation of power). For 
example, it might be possible for debt management functions to be concentrated within central 
government. 
   I n   i t s   Guidelines for Public Debt Management published in March 2001, the IMF emphasized that 
governance must be implemented both from a legal and an organizational perspective.
21 
 
IV.1.  Enhancing  Responsibility:  Default Legislation for Public Bodies 
 
      Enhancing responsibility for repayments means adopting a policy which ensures guaranteed 
repayments. One specific measure might be, for example, to strengthen or clarify the penalties 
                                                                            
20  For example, as of June 2005, the issue of municipal bonds requires the approval of the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs and Communications. A consultation system will be introduced in 2006, but at present 
the conditions for the Ministry’s approval are unclear and generally arbitrary. 
21  The IMF Guidelines regarding governance are directed towards debt management authorities.   Policy Research Institute, Ministry of Finance, Japan, Public Policy Review, Vol.4, No.1, December 2008 15 
applicable in the case of repayment default. The alternative, where no system is in place to deal 
with defaults, is a situation in which legislation may be unable to deal with debtors who end up 
being bailed out when they are in difficulties. This is not to say that debtors, or in this case 
p u b l i c  b o d i e s ,  s h o u l d  b e  a l l o w e d  t o  f a i l .  I t  i s  s i m p l y  t o  e n s u r e  t h a t ,  t h r o u g h  t h i s  s y s t e m ,  
financial regulation can be improved. 
      However, when it comes to default by public bodies, there are a number of legislative issues 
to be considered. We will discuss the default legislation issues below, particularly with respect 




IV.1.1.  General  remarks 
 
  (1)    Recent increase in awareness 
 
   When debt repayments are delayed, someone has to bear that burden. In the case of public 
debt, this means that taxes or business revenues must be increased (the burden is placed on 
taxpayers or beneficiaries), or subsidies must be provided (in the first instance by central 
government, but ultimately by taxpayers), or the level of debt reduced (creditors).
23 Of these, 
the most acceptable would be to increase revenues such as taxes. When this method proves 
difficult, it seems that subsidies would be the alternative. But, implementing either of these two 
methods would serve only to disguise the default, and the grounds for apportioning 
responsibility would also become unclear. 
   In the midst of these problems, the question of default legislation for public bodies has 
attracted much attention recently. While joint public-private corporations and local public 
corporations, etc. continue to fail, default by public bodies has become a fact of life. Even in the 
academic world, research into bankruptcy legislation for public corporations has been 
increasing steadily. 
 
  (2)    What is the process of bankruptcy? 
 
      In simple terms, the general bankruptcy process is as follows: Debt repayments cannot all be 
met, and the debtor’s assets are distributed fairly among all creditors giving priority to no 
individual creditor. Under bankruptcy legislation, the process can be divided into four steps.
24 
Firstly, the courts determine whether or not the debtor is insolvent and make a declaration of 
                                                                            
22  The term “default” may sound too strong, but in this paper, it refers to measures to mitigate debt 
repayment difficulties in general. 
23  Besides these, there is the possibility of repayment by creating a new debt burden, but this is simply to 
postpone the problem and ultimately one or other of these parties must bear that burden. 
24  Bankruptcy is considered as a form of insolvency (liquidation). 16  Y. Goto / Public Policy Review 
bankruptcy if that is the case. Then the debtor’s assets are ascertained and their value calculated. 
The amount each creditor is to be compensated is then determined, and finally, the debtor’s 
assets are distributed. 
      When this process is applied to public corporations, the first difficulty relates to the process 
of declaring bankruptcy. Before bankruptcy can be declared, both the “capacity for bankruptcy” 
and the “cause of bankruptcy” must be identified. The capacity for bankruptcy refers to whether 
the debtor can actually become bankrupt in the first place. The cause of bankruptcy refers to 
whether the financial state of the debtor has deteriorated to the extent that bankruptcy 
proceedings can begin. Firstly, this would be defined as an inability to repay debts which are 
already due, a failure to pay the debt in full, and the inability to repay the debts within a 
reasonable duration. An inability to repay debts means that, objectively speaking, debts which 
are due have not been paid on time, the greater part has not been paid, and there is no prospect 
of the debt being paid within a reasonable period. Where repayments have been suspended, for 
example due to non-payment of drafts, this will also be regarded as inability to pay. A second 
cause of bankruptcy would be liabilities in excess of assets.
25 Under the new bankruptcy 
procedures, the Corporate Rehabilitation Law and the Civil Rehabilitation Law, there is now a 
third possible cause of bankruptcy, in that if the debt cannot be repaid without virtually 
preventing the continuation of the business, that is one step prior to bankruptcy, one can apply 
for bankruptcy proceedings to begin. 
 
(3)    Three problems arising from the nature of public corporations 
 
   Unlike private enterprises, there are difficulties in bankrupting a public corporation. The 
three points below discuss the ways in which the specific characteristics of public corporations 
cause problems in the application of bankruptcy legislation. 
   A .   “ P o s s i b i l i t y   o f   b a n k r u p t c y ”  
   In order to establish bankruptcy legislation for public companies, it is necessary 1. to 
discover whether or not the “possibility of bankruptcy”
26 exists, and 2. to define “grounds for 
bankruptcy”
27. Unlike private enterprises, the problem with the capacity for bankruptcy with 
regard to public corporations arises from the fact that they are bodies which provide 
government services and so cannot be allowed to fail in the way that private companies can, 
                                                                            
25  Excessive liability can be the cause of bankruptcy for a company, but not in the case of limited 
companies and partnerships. 
26  In this paper, the capacity for bankruptcy includes what is defined under insolvency law as the capacity 
for insolvency (for example, eligibility under the Civil Rehabilitation Law, etc.). Furthermore, the term 
“capacity for bankruptcy” is a term adopted for convenience in this paper, and is not a legal expression. 
27  As with the capacity for insolvency, in this paper, the cause of bankruptcy includes what is defined 
under insolvency law as the cause of insolvency. This term is also adopted for convenience in this paper, 
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simply because of a shortage of capital.
28 
B. “Grounds for bankruptcy” 
      Unlike private enterprises, determining the cause of bankruptcy is also difficult in the case 
of local self-governing bodies. This is because it is difficult to declare bankruptcy given the 
various sources of financial support, through tax allocations and subsidies, which they receive. 
Possible ways to deal with this problem might include, 1. for a given term, define the thresholds 
over which debt will be incurred based on the forecast income for that period, and 2. a radical 
overhaul of the subsidy system with a new definition of bankruptcy. 
      C. Conflict between the democratic process and judicial control 
   In a democracy, public corporations are basically under the control of the citizens or 
residents. If we assume bankruptcy legislation, the process will be taken over by the judiciary, 
who are not under democratic control. On this point, more than is the case with private 
enterprises, it is important to consider the possible necessity for limitations to be imposed on 
judicial intervention. 
 
IV.1.2.    Default legislation for self-governing bodies 
 
      Based on the three arguments discussed above, the following discussion will consider, from a 
legal point of view, the possibility of a bankruptcy system as applied in particular to local 
self-governing bodies. 
 
  (1)    The possibility of bankruptcy for local self-governing bodies 
 
      Legal experts agree that it is impossible under existing law to bring insolvency proceedings 
against local self-governing bodies and bring about their dissolution as legal entities, and that it 
is difficult to imagine what such legislation would be like. This is because, from a legal point of 
view, they do not recognize the possibility of legal dissolution through bankruptcy for what are 
fundamentally legislative entities, such as self-governing bodies.
29  Furthermore, if a legislative 
body were to lose its right to management of its assets through bankruptcy, it would no longer 
be able to govern.
30 
   If we turn to the reformed bankruptcy laws, and take the Civil Rehabilitation Law as an 
example, even though there are no restrictions on eligibility under this law
31, there is almost no 
                                                                            
28  The capacity for insolvency is generally left vague for public corporations. The Insolvency 
Sub-Committee of the Legislative Council’s Bankruptcy Legislation Committee has not made a decision 
on the insolvency of public corporations stating that, “We are still discussing the regulations under 
which public corporations can be declared insolvent.” 
29 Itoh  (2001). 
30  Aoyama, et al. (2001). 
31  There are no restrictions on eligibility for rehabilitation status.    Corporations, individuals (natural 
persons), unincorporated associations and foundations, foreigners, and foreign corporations are all 18  Y. Goto / Public Policy Review 
literature even on the applicability of the law to self-governing bodies. However, the aim of the 
Rehabilitation Law is not the dissolution of the self-governing body, but its rehabilitation 
through restructuring of debt and rationalization.    Therefore, even if insolvency law cannot be 
applied to self-governing bodies, this doesn’t rule out the possibility of eligibility under the 
Rehabilitation Law. 
 
  (2)    Causes of bankruptcy for local self-governing bodies 
 
   The most obvious cause of default is of course difficulties with, or inability to meet 
repayments. Under US law on bankruptcy of local self-governing bodies (Chapter 9 of the 
Federal Bankruptcy Law, “Adjustment of Debts of A Municipality”, which aims at rehabilitation 
rather then insolvency)
32, the “cash flow insolvency test” is used to determine bankruptcy. In 
other words, the inability to secure cash flow (inability to repay) is grounds for bankruptcy.
33 
Self-governing bodies in the US are not usually guaranteed a constant source of subsidy from the 
state government, and so there is always the possibility of default. Of course, the US system 
could not be adopted wholesale in Japan, but there is no mistaking the potency of using inability 
to raise funds as grounds for bankruptcy.
34 In short, it is important to place thresholds for 
inability to meet repayments at the center of our discussion. 
 
  (3)    Democratic process and changes to the judicial system 
 
   L o c a l  s e l f -governing bodies are controlled by the voters through the assembly.  However, 
when we consider bankruptcy legislation, it is the courts which deal with the process. On this 
point also, US local government bankruptcy law introduces one important perspective. Under 
this law, the debtor, in this case the local government body, has considerable control as 
debtor-in-possession. The courts and the receiver are not involved in the implementation of the 
rehabilitation plan
35, resident self-governance is still effective in the rehabilitation process, and 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
included (Civil Rehabilitation Law, Article 3). 
32  This is part of the federal code, since the Contract Clause of the US Constitution says that state law 
cannot intervene between creditors and debtors. 
33  In the case of Bridgeport, Connecticut, the courts refused to rule the city bankrupt because it still had 
the ability to borrow and so could not be said to have “run out of cash” even though, despite having 
levied the highest taxes in the state, the city was in the red. In other words, insolvency can be avoided 
simply by borrowing more money. 
34  The insolvency threshold used to determine bankruptcy for profit-making organizations is not used in 
the case of partnerships. 
35  In fact, there is an argument, advanced by Woodford and Picker (1993), that for bankrupt 
self-governing bodies, Chapter 9 may not always the best route. According to this argument, the object 
of bankruptcy for self-governing bodies is more like bankruptcy law for private individuals than for 
companies, in that it should aim to help the debtor recover through rationalization. Since the bankruptcy 
came about as a result of poor governance on the part of the self-governing body, rehabilitation must 
therefore come about through cost cutting, disposal of assets, and tax increases, under oversight by the 
courts, as is the case with other bankruptcies. Yet under the framework of the current law, approval of   Policy Research Institute, Ministry of Finance, Japan, Public Policy Review, Vol.4, No.1, December 2008 19 
it is not always necessary to resort to tax hikes. The only major influence the courts have is in 
deciding whether the plan maximizes the advantage of creditors; the so-called “greatest benefit 
to the creditor” rule.
36  Some have argued that, even under Japanese law, it is necessary to focus 
on the DIP rehabilitation process, in order to ensure the democratic balance.
37 
In any case, the status of the judiciary is problematic. At the very least, we need to consider the 
legal implications of the constitution in relation to self-governing bodies and local government 
legislation. We may also need to investigate the position of the fiscal reconstruction system. 
 
IV.1.3.      The bankruptcy system for quasi-governmental organizations, etc.
38 
 
   Next we will discuss the bankruptcy procedure for bodies such as quasi-governmental 
corporations. Insolvency in the case of quasi-governmental corporations can be seen as a matter 
for the courts. On the hand, where rehabilitation is a possibility, there seem to be no reason to 
deny application of the Civil Rehabilitation Law. However, as is the case with local government, 
it is difficult to define inability to repay or overspending because of the funding and subsidies 
they receive. Also, though not to the same extent as local government, since they fall under the 
purview of the administration, any rehabilitation plan cannot be free of government and 
administration influence because the public good must be taken into consideration. 
      Corporation Rehabilitation Law is one example of a possible legal basis for rehabilitation of 
quasi-governmental corporations, but this is aimed at joint stock corporations and cannot be 
applied as is. The following section looks at the particular characteristics of public 
corporations. 
 
  (1)    The possibility of bankruptcy for quasi-governmental corporations 
 
   The theoretical grounds for bankruptcy of quasi-governmental corporations are not as 
strictly defined as for local government. Firstly, let us take liquidation bankruptcy as an 
example. The accepted view is that since quasi-governmental corporations are peculiar in 
h a v i n g  a  h i g h  p u b l i c  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  a s  p a r t  of the administration, they cannot be declared 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
the rehabilitation plan depends on the court’s deciding that it meets the criterion of “the greatest benefit 
to the creditor”, which could allow the courts to interfere in the political and administrative functions of 
the self-governing body. 
36  In order for the rehabilitation plan to be acceptable, for each category of credit, more than half of the 
creditors must agree to the plan, and the amount due to those creditors must be at least two-thirds of 
the total amount. For some categories of credit, even if less than half of creditors accept the plan, it is 
possible for an appeal to be made to the courts to have the plan accepted, but it must follow the “greatest 
benefit to the creditor” rule.     
37  See Kitami (2004). 
38  In this paper, “quasi-governmental organization” includes independent administrative agencies, as 
defined in the Act on General Rules of the Independent Administrative Agencies Law, and corporations 
established directly under Article 4 Section 15 of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications 
Act for Establishment. 20  Y. Goto / Public Policy Review 
insolvent. However, arguments for the possibility of insolvency have recently gained ground.
39 
Such theories argue that, 1. the possibility of insolvency should be based on the strength of the 
public responsibility of the corporation; and more recently, 2. judgment should be based on 
whether there is self-supporting accounting or not (legal independence from national or local 
government, and self-financing); and 3. it is appropriate to recognize in the first place that 
public corporations, excluding national and local governments, can become insolvent, and then 
to consider the public nature, viability and economic base of the corporation. 
   Even in recent theory, there are still those who argue that insolvency should not apply to 
quasi-governmental corporations simply based on an interpretation of existing law. In such 
cases, 4. the deciding factor should be the legislators’ intention as expressed in the law itself. 
That is to say, dissolution of the corporation can be brought about using separate legislation if 
the legislation covering the incorporation of the quasi-governmental corporation includes a 
clause allowing such a situation. And so, the capacity for insolvency is possible through new 
legislation. For those quasi-governmental corporations which have been converted into joint 
stock companies, insolvency cannot be denied simply on the basis of the public responsibility of 
the corporation unless this is covered in the original incorporation legislation.
40 
41 
Since there is no reason normally to deny application of the Civil Rehabilitation Law
42, 
rehabilitation bankruptcy in the case of quasi-governmental corporations may be seen as 
acceptable. 
 
  (2)    Grounds for bankruptcy of quasi-governmental corporations 
 
   A s  w i t h  l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s ,  w h e n  w e  t u r n  to grounds for bankruptcy, the fact that these 
corporations receive funding and other subsidies, it is difficult to identify overspending and the 
inability to meet debt obligations. Below we will distinguish between independent 
administrative corporations and quasi-governmental corporations. 
   A.  Independent  administrative  corporations
43 
                                                                            
39 Nishizawa  (1983),  Hiroshi  Yamamoto (2002a, 2002b). 
40  Hiroshi Yamamoto (2002b, p331). 
41  The dissolution of quasi-governmental corporations which have become joint stock companies requires 
the approval of the relevant government minister. So, even though insolvency is possible, this issue must 
be taken into account. For example, in Article 13 of the Narita International Airport Company Law, it 
states that, “any change in the company’s articles of association, processing of profits and losses, merging, 
or decision to restructure or dissolve, cannot take effect without the approval of the Minister for Land, 
Infrastructure and Transport.” 
42  See Egashira (2002). 
43  Article 45 of the Basic Law on Independent Administrative Corporations states that, “Independent 
administrative corporations may only borrow limited funds for a short period under the terms of Article 
30 Section 2 Item4”, but Article 45 Section 5 states that, “Independent administrative corporations 
cannot borrow funds long term or issue bonds unless permitted by separate laws.” In other words, 
long-term loans could be permissible under separate legislation. 
In fact, Article 19 of the Japan Student Services Organization Law states that, “the Organization may 
borrow funds long term or issue Japan Student Services bonds with the approval of the Minister of 
Education in order to cover expenses related to the provision of educational loans, as covered in Article   Policy Research Institute, Ministry of Finance, Japan, Public Policy Review, Vol.4, No.1, December 2008 21 
   The legal basis for operating subsidies is Article 46 of the Basic Law on Independent 
Administrative Corporations which states that, “The Government can provide financial support 
from the budget to meet all or part of the operating costs of independent administrative 
corporations.” General accounting and special accounting budgetary measures are determined on 
the basis of this legislation. However, this legislation cannot be interpreted as giving 
independent administrative organizations the right to such funding. It is possible within the law 
for the Government to cut this funding as part of any cost-cutting policy measure.
44 
   Even though not guaranteed as a legal right, if financial support continues to come from 
general accounting, special accounting, public funds and so on, it is difficult to arrive at a 
definition of debt default even on accounting grounds. This is because, in current independent 
administrative organization accounting, no substantive losses arise. In independent 
administrative organization accounting, because operating allowances cover all costs, they are 
considered as income,
45  and there is no way for debt default to occur.
46  The peculiarities of this 
accounting method must be borne in mind. 
   B .   Q u a s i -governmental corporations 
   The accounting standards which apply to quasi-governmental corporations are not as 
generous as those for independent administrative organizations
47, but thanks basically to 
subsidies, no losses show up on the accounts. However, there are many self-financing 
quasi-governmental organizations, such as the Japan Racing Association and NHK. In this case 
there is the possibility of both inability to meet debt obligations and overspending, but 
quasi-governmental corporations which have not become joint stock companies usually have 
only the possibility of failure to meet obligations. But, for both independent administrative 
organizations and quasi-governmental corporations, there is little chance of default as long as 
they continue to receive funding which is not limited by policy decision.
48 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
13 Section 1 Item 1.” Hence, a standard is still required for grounds for bankruptcy of independent 
administrative organizations. 
44  The Government can decide as a policy not to provide any debt guarantee. Particular legislation covers 
debt guarantee. For example, Article 23 of the Japan Student Services Organization Law states that, 
“regardless of Article 3 of the law detailing the limits of governmental financial support for corporations 
(Law 24, 1946), within the sum agreed by the Diet, the Government can guarantee the Organization’s 
debts incurred by long-term loans or bonds（except for debts guaranteed by the Government under 
Article 2 of the law relating to special measures covering the receipt of foreign capital from, for example, 
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development（Law 51, 1953） ）.” These guarantees are not 
established as legal rights, and so are completely dependent on government policy. 
45  For details of accounting see Okamoto et al. (2001, p311), etc. 
46  However, the possibility of losses cannot be denied for self-financing organizations. 
47  The accounting standards for quasi-governmental corporations (except independent administrative 
organizations) are based on regulations introduced in October 1987.   
48  A completely different approach advocates weighing the relative cost of aiding or forsaking those 
quasi-governmental corporations facing financial difficulties and then deciding whether, on policy and 
discretionary grounds, dissolution of the corporation is to proceed. See Sakurauchi (2004, p278). 22  Y. Goto / Public Policy Review 
  (3)    The balance between democratic process and judicial control 
 
   Unlike  local  governments,  quasi-governmental corporations tend to emphasize their 
independence, and being far removed from the democratic process, democratic pressures are 
relatively weak. Under the basic law covering quasi-governmental corporations, the relevant 
supervisory authorities have wide-ranging powers, but the administration’s power to control 
quasi-governmental organizations is not as strong as the constitutional rights of local residents 
through their local authorities. 
 
IV.2.    Centralized Management of Debt 
 
   One more approach to balancing authority and responsibility would be to transfer some of 
the authority and monitoring functions if there is the possibility of failure to meet debt 
obligations. In this case, for example, focus might shift towards central government as the 
ultimate authority over the public sector. We could then expect a putting in order of the 
government’s internal capital flow and decision-making process, and an improvement in 
governance. Based on these ideas, some experts have advocated the establishment in Japan of a 
“Special Bureau for the General Management of Public Debt” (see Masaaki Honma’s 2003 
proposal when he was a member of the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy; Ikeo (2002);, 
PHP General Research Institute (2003); Mitsubishi Research Institute (2004), etc.).   
      However, how far authority should be concentrated is a difficult issue. If the authority were 
to cover even debt capacity, that could have a direct effect on the scope of public sector budgets 
and repercussions for the entire fiscal system. Many foreign countries do indeed have ”Debt 
Management Agencies”. For example, in the UK or Germany, such agencies play a certain role in 
the management of public debt. However, foreign debt management agencies’ duties are 
more-or-less limited to the cost-efficient management of national bonds. 
   Even we if we disregard the organizational theory of establishing a new specialist 
department, we could at the very least expect an improvement in governance of public debt 
through a strengthening of monitoring if there were some function which could view the whole 
range of public debts together. For example, it is easy to produce a simulation such as a “stress 
test” which could determine how much changing circumstances, such as an interest rate hike, 
would increase interest repayment costs for the whole public sector. But since we do not have 
this kind of function at present, there is a concern that interest repayment costs could snowball 
should there be an increase in interest rates.
49 
   Several specific initiatives have recently been progressing along these lines. The “National 
                                                                            
49  For example, the Mitsubishi Research Institute (2004) found that interest payment costs, for national 
bonds alone, could vary widely depending on, 1. what is covered by national bonds (whether FB and 
investment and loan bonds are included), and 2. how changes in the yield curve are configured when 
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Balance Sheet” which has been published since 1999 by the Finance Ministry, despite being 
limited to central government, is an attempt to provide an overall account of public debt (and 
assets).  The Finance Ministry also produces the “Debt Management Report” to present data 
and information about the public debt system, including local government and 
government-related agencies. Furthermore, disclosure of financial information relating to 
special accounting and quasi-governmental corporations, etc., has been increased. The rules 
governing this area have also been improved. This has also helped invigorate research into public 
accounting. In this paper, we have not discussed public accounting, but as research in this area 
advances, we can expect this to contribute also to the general management of public debt. 
   This centralized management and improvements in the default system mentioned above, do 
not contradict each other. If there is a department which can be decentralized, this is best done 
once they are fully capable of meeting their responsibilities. To decentralize and open up to the 
discipline of the market is one way of thinking, but there are limits to the responsibilities which 
public organizations can shoulder. Basically, they cannot undergo liquidation bankruptcy, and 
even with regard to rehabilitation, central government will judge whether or not the 
organization receives financial support, for example, to maintain its business scale. Since central 
government must bear responsibility in the final analysis for public organizations’ debts, it 
would be sensible to give the government some kind of central management system to fulfill this 
responsibility. 
 
V.    Towards a Conclusion 
 
      The unprecedented increase in public debt in developed countries seems beyond that which 
can be controlled by any one term’s budget. Nobody seems confident about their ability to 
withstand, for example, an unexpected increase in interest rates. Of course, the best course for 
strengthening public finances is to reduce annual expenditure and increase revenues, but one 
cannot expect too much from this in debt management. However, there is no mistaking the fact 
that more attention than ever must be paid to the question of both flow and stock in controlling 
public debt. 
   Under the present system where authority and responsibility are vague, not only those 
departments which increase public debt, but also related departments could, to a greater or 
lesser extent, end up carrying the burden of this debt through “indirect debt liability”. In fact, 
general accounting has in the end been burdened with the debts of the former national railway, 
and local governments are increasingly finding themselves burdened by the various operating 
difficulties of public-private joint ventures and local public corporations. As Japan’s public 
sector debt repayment reserves are rapidly being used up, there are growing calls for public debt 
regulation and for a system to guarantee such regulation. 
      There is no simple key to planning a system for a government which is so large and has such 24  Y. Goto / Public Policy Review 
an idiosyncratic form. The taxpaying and voting citizens should have the final say over 
government policy, but recently creditors have an increasingly important role in the governance 
of public debt. The idea of self-regulation within the public sector is another alternative. In any 
case, it is not a matter to be solved simply by decentralization. The basic principle is to ensure 
the appropriate authority and responsibility for the given task and circumstances. However, it is 
not difficult to imagine that one would face a number of problems if one tried to put this into 
practice. The default system for public corporations and the centralization of public debts we 
have considered in this paper give only a general indication of a possible way forward. In reality, 
a constant and detailed assessment of the adequacy of the mission, the appropriate levels for 
subsidies, the distribution of responsibility, and other factors, will be essential.   Policy Research Institute, Ministry of Finance, Japan, Public Policy Review, Vol.4, No.1, December 2008 25 










Note    The government guarantee obligations of quasi-governmental organizations (marked  ＊) are also 
listed under the category of central government contingency debt guarantee. 
 
Table 2: Source of Funds for Various Public Debts 
（unit: %） 




















581 86 61 57 111  76 
Central Government  9.2 19.7 70.9 0.1 0.0  11.8 
of which, Fiscal Loan  9.2 12.3 70.9 0.0 0.0  11.7 
Social Security Fund  7.4 0.0 0.0 3.5 0.0  8.4 
Postal Savings  14.5 2.3 0.0 17.2 0.0  5.2 
Postal Life Insurance  9.0 1.4 0.0 13.0 0.0  24.8 
Government-affiliated   
organizations 
0.5 0.1 0.0 0.3 87.4  0.0 
Local Government  0.1 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0  0.2 
Bank of Japan  14.7 15.7 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 
Main Public Sector total  55.4 39.1 70.9 34.9 87.4  50.5 
Main Private 
 Financial  Sector 
26.9 50.9 29.1 56.9 11.9  37.9 
Private Enterprise  0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.0  2.1 
Households  2.5 0.0 0.0 2.1 0.0  0.8 
Overseas  3.5 4.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  1.0 
Other  11.7 6.0 0.0 4.9 0.7  7.7 
Total  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0 
Note 1: Based on secondary market value. 
Note 2: The primary private financial sector comprises banks, life and accident insurance brokers, 
securities companies, investment trusts and non-bank finance companies, etc. as included in the 
Circulation of Funds Statistics. 
Note 3: For convenience, local government borrowing from the non-financial sector is included under 
‘other’. 
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Figure 1: The Flow and Decision-Making for Funding of Public Debt 
 
  [key to diagrams] 
Public debt: 1. funding flows in the direction of the arrows, 2. funding from 
below is from the markets (private sector), while horizontal funding is from 
the public sector. 
Governance carried out by the public sector on the decision-making 
process for public debt burden. 
 
 






























【other Public Sector】 



































































Note 1: Since the Foreign Exchange Special Account falls under the jurisdiction of the 
International Department of the Ministry of Finance, it is included under 
Government Agencies. 
Note 2: Covers FBs under special accounts such as the Food Agency Special Account. 
Other treasury securities are included in the General Account.   








































Note 1: Since the Foreign Exchange Special Account falls under the jurisdiction of the 
International Department of the Ministry of Finance, it is included under 
Government Agencies. 
Note 2: Covers FBs under special accounts such as the Food Agency Special Account. 
Other treasury securities are included in the General Account.   
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  Sources: Various government documents. 
 
Note: It is important to bear in mind that unlike other public debts, borrowing for 
pensions obligations does not involve cash. 
MoF 
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Table 3: Public Debt Repayment Funds 
(i) Amount of annual revenue allocated for debt repayment (trillion yen). 






















Other revenues  1.9 107.7 6.7 na  na  na 
From other 
accounts 
1.8 47.7 31.5 8.9 3.4 5.6 
Total  47.8 158.6 71.5 na  na  na 
(ii) Proportion of annual revenue allocated for debt repayment (percentage). 
















Tax revenues  92.1 2.0 46.6 - - - 
Other revenues  4.1 67.9 9.4 na  na  na 
From other 
accounts 
3.9 30.1 44.0 na  na  na 
Total  100.0 100.0 100.0 na  na  na 
Note 1: Based on the initial budget for 2005. The total covers annual revenues excluding bond issues and 
borrowing. 
Note 2: ‘From other accounts’ comprises funds received from other government sector accounts. 
Note 3: ‘Other revenues’ comprises total non-borrowing annual revenue except tax revenues and revenues 
from other accounts. Therefore, surplus funds from the previous year’s account are included. 
Note 4: For special accounts, revenue from fiscal loan funds is considered as revenue from borrowing. 
Note 5: For special accounts, funds from other special accounts are deducted. When several accounts exist 
within a special account, these are also deducted. 
Note 6: For quasi-governmental organizations, etc., na indicates that relevant data is not available. 
Sources: 2005 Budget; ‘Financial Affairs Figures’, Upper House Budget Committee Research Office. 
 
















Tax revenues  Cannot impose taxes  Cannot impose taxes  Cannot impose taxes 
Other revenues  1.2  0.3 9.6 
From other accounts  0.0  0.0 0.4 
Total  1.2  0.3 10.0 
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(iv) Example: Proportion of annual revenue allocated for repayment of 















Tax revenues  -  - - 
Other revenues  100.0  84.8 95.7 
From other accounts  0.0  15.2 4.3 
Total  100.0  100.0 100.0 
Note 1: Based on the initial budget for 2005. Total annual revenue refers to all positive cash flow except 
revenue from borrowing. 
Note 2: ‘From other accounts’ comprises funds received from other government sector accounts. 
Note 3: ‘Other revenues’ refers to annual revenue except tax revenues, ‘From other accounts’, and 
borrowing. Therefore, surplus funds from the previous year’s account are included. This is 
basically the same as ‘operating income’. 
Sources: Mitsubishi Research Institute, Inc., based on, 2005 Budget; ‘Financial Affairs Figures’, Upper 
House Budget Committee Research Office. 
 



















Note 1 : Japan Highway Public Corporation third issue FILP Bond (redeemable June 20, 2007); National 
Life Finance Corporation first issue FILP Bond; Development Bank of Japan third issue FILP Bond 
(redeemable June 20, 2007). 
Note 2: The spread is the gap between yield and the medium-term 5-year National Bond (issue 20, 
redeemable June 20, 2007).   
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Additional Figure 1: Credit and Debt Within Government Departments 
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Additional Diagram 2: Public Debt Repayment Funds（*） 
 














3. Government Borrowing (Oil Special Account)  4. Government Borrowing 











































































































































































































































































































Note: for comparison with Diagram 1, the Finance Special Account is 





































































 32  Y. Goto / Public Policy Review 
 





































7. FILP Bonds, Government Guaranteed Bonds 
(Government-affiliated organizations) 
8. FILP Bonds, Government Guaranteed Bonds 
(independent administrative institution) 
9. FILP Bonds, Government Guaranteed Bonds 
(Special company) 
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